Neuroscience
I need to put together posts on Heft and a couple of other points, but we've been noticing more and more examples of people expressing the same worry we have - that psychology is no longer a field with theories, merely phenomena. A couple of links that came our way this week:
The APS Observer has an article interviewing several intro textbook authors, asking them how they think the field has changed. Many commented on the lack of a single theoretical structure, and the way psychologists define themselves with respect to phenomena: 'I study memory' vs. 'I'm a behaviourist'. No one really noted that this was a bad thing: in fact, the multiplicity of 'perspectives' is broadly seen as a strength; these perspectives include evolutionary psychology, positive psychology, etc. (My thought: none of these are theories in the Kuhnian sense.)
Second - I haven't had a chance to read this Glenberg article yet, but the opening paragraph reads
Glenberg, A. M. (2010). Embodiment as a unifying perspective for psychology. Cognitive Science. DOI: 10.1002/wcs.55.
- What Would It Take To Refute Radical Embodied Cognition?
People often send us papers and data via Twitter that they believe rule out a radical, non-representational theory of cognition. Because I have yet to agree about any of these studies, these people then often ask in exasperated tones 'well, what would you...
- Does Action Scaling Predict 'the Embodiment Of Culture'? (no.)
I recently reviewed a paper for Frontiers by Arthur Glenberg and colleagues called 'Sensory motor mechanisms unify psychology: the embodiment of culture' (Soliman, Gibson & Glenberg, 2014). This is part of an ongoing research topic on embodied...
- 'embodied Cognition', By Lawrence Shapiro
'Embodied Cognition', by philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, is not a book advocating for any particular brand of embodiment. Instead, Shapiro has performed an invaluable service and written an overview of the current state-of-the-art in embodied cognition....
- Chemero (2009), Chapter 2: Embodied Cognition
Chemero spent Chapter 1 creating space for himself and his book in the marketplace of ideas about how we should do our cognitive science. Chapter 2 is about situating his theory in amongst the competition, with the goal of establishing exactly what a...
- Chemero (2009), Chapter 1: Hegelian Arguments In Cognitive Science
The basic thesis of RECS is that cognitive science should give up on representations (the radical bit) and focus on explaining the embodiment of cognition in a complex, perceiving-acting dynamical system. Chemero spends Chapter 1 heading off the likely...
Neuroscience
It's not just us, honest
I need to put together posts on Heft and a couple of other points, but we've been noticing more and more examples of people expressing the same worry we have - that psychology is no longer a field with theories, merely phenomena. A couple of links that came our way this week:
The APS Observer has an article interviewing several intro textbook authors, asking them how they think the field has changed. Many commented on the lack of a single theoretical structure, and the way psychologists define themselves with respect to phenomena: 'I study memory' vs. 'I'm a behaviourist'. No one really noted that this was a bad thing: in fact, the multiplicity of 'perspectives' is broadly seen as a strength; these perspectives include evolutionary psychology, positive psychology, etc. (My thought: none of these are theories in the Kuhnian sense.)
Second - I haven't had a chance to read this Glenberg article yet, but the opening paragraph reads
Why is progress slow in psychology? Perhaps it is because there is so little agreement among the content areas (e.g., cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, social, and so on), or perhaps, as Mischel speculates, the drive for individual recognition and theory development precludes a cumulative advance. A third, but related, possibility is that areas do not talk the same language; they do not have the same organizing principles and metaphors, and hence it is difficult to ascertain commonalities in approach, data, and theory.That's about it: no single theory, everyone desperate to have a theory named after them, and Kuhnian incommensurability. Glenberg is going to suggest embodied cognition is the way to unite psychology. but ironically this field is just as fractured and in the same way as psychology in general. New Scientist had an article about embodied cognition just recently but it's about research I wouldn't rate that highly: research showing that things we think about have measurable consequences on our bodies (eg random number generation influencing eye movements, or this rubbish suggesting mental time travel influences posture). I tend to think embodied cognition should entail ecological ideas: consequences for cognition from the type of organism that we are, not the other way round.
Glenberg, A. M. (2010). Embodiment as a unifying perspective for psychology. Cognitive Science. DOI: 10.1002/wcs.55.
- What Would It Take To Refute Radical Embodied Cognition?
People often send us papers and data via Twitter that they believe rule out a radical, non-representational theory of cognition. Because I have yet to agree about any of these studies, these people then often ask in exasperated tones 'well, what would you...
- Does Action Scaling Predict 'the Embodiment Of Culture'? (no.)
I recently reviewed a paper for Frontiers by Arthur Glenberg and colleagues called 'Sensory motor mechanisms unify psychology: the embodiment of culture' (Soliman, Gibson & Glenberg, 2014). This is part of an ongoing research topic on embodied...
- 'embodied Cognition', By Lawrence Shapiro
'Embodied Cognition', by philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, is not a book advocating for any particular brand of embodiment. Instead, Shapiro has performed an invaluable service and written an overview of the current state-of-the-art in embodied cognition....
- Chemero (2009), Chapter 2: Embodied Cognition
Chemero spent Chapter 1 creating space for himself and his book in the marketplace of ideas about how we should do our cognitive science. Chapter 2 is about situating his theory in amongst the competition, with the goal of establishing exactly what a...
- Chemero (2009), Chapter 1: Hegelian Arguments In Cognitive Science
The basic thesis of RECS is that cognitive science should give up on representations (the radical bit) and focus on explaining the embodiment of cognition in a complex, perceiving-acting dynamical system. Chemero spends Chapter 1 heading off the likely...